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A discrete time version of the replicator equation for two strategy games is studied. The stationary
properties differ from those of continuous time for sufficiently large values of the parameters, where
periodic and chaotic behavior replace the usual fixed point population solutions. We observe the familiar
period doubling and chaotic band splitting attractor cascades of unimodal maps but in some cases more
elaborate variations appear due to bimodality. Also unphysical stationary solutions can have unusual
physical implications, such as the uncertainty of the final population caused by sensitivity to initial
conditions and fractality of attractor preimage manifolds.
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Evolutionary dynamics deals with a generic situation in
which individuals interact and reproduce according to the
result of that interaction, which in turn depends on the
composition of the population [1–3]. This feedback loop
gives rise to highly nontrivial phenomena that have at-
tracted the interest of the physics community from the
dynamical systems [4–7], statistical mechanics [8–10]
and extended systems [11–14] viewpoints. A particularly
important class of problems is encompassed by the family
generically referred to as replicator dynamics [15–17]. If xi
is the frequency of type i ¼ 1; . . . ; n, x 2 Rn is the fre-
quency vector describing the population as a whole, and
the interaction is given by the n n payoff matrix A, then
ðAxÞi is the expected payoff for an individual of type i and
xTAx is the average payoff of the population. Assuming
that the per capita rate of growth is given by the difference
between the payoff for type i and the average payoff in the
population, we arrive at the replicator equation
_x i ¼ xi½ðAxÞi  xTAx: (1)
Other forms have been proposed for this equation, which,
e.g., include a denominator given by the average global
payoff (albeit in this case the orbits of the resulting equa-
tion are the same) or other modifications (see, e.g., [3]; see
also [18] and references therein). However, Eq. (1) is the
one most often studied, and therefore we will stick to this
form in the following.
Among the very many nonlinear phenomena exhibited
by the replicator equation, the appearance of chaotic dy-
namics has been studied in a number of papers. The
Poincare´-Bendixson theorem [19] establishes that chaos
can only arise in a continuous dynamical system (specified
by differential equations) if it has three or more dimen-
sions. Accordingly, Skyrms [20] showed that chaos does
not exist for three types (also referred to as strategies) and
gave examples of chaotic dynamics on strange attractors
with four strategies. Further examples were provided in
[21,22]. Subsequently, Sato et al. [23] found both
Hamiltonian and non-Hamiltonian chaos in a three-type
version of the rock-scissors-paper game [1,16] by introduc-
ing asymmetry (payoffs depend on being the first or the
second to interact).
In this Letter we show that replicator dynamics does lead
to chaos in games with only two types when the discretized
version of the equation is considered, i.e.,
xitþ1 ¼ xit þ xit½ðAxtÞi  ðxtÞTAxt; (2)
where xt is the composition of the population at time t. We
will refer to Eq. (2) in what follows as the replicator
mapping and it can be seen as arising from situations in
which changes per generation are not necessarily small
[16]. We note that this is one of several existing discrete
versions of the replicator equations [18] and, in particular,
it has been considered in [24,25]. As we will see below, the
relevance of this result goes beyond the observation of
chaos in low-dimensional systems under the required cir-
cumstances: Indeed, the occurrence of chaos as well as of
periodic trajectories gives rise to unexpected behavior in
well-known games for which so far only rest points have
been reported.
We will focus on the generic two-strategy game given by
the payoff matrix
(3)
C D
C 1 S
D T 0
where payoffs for the row player are indicated. This choice
encompasses several of the most important dilemmas aris-
ing in both biological and social applications. According to
the values of T and S, we have four basic social dilemmas:
When T > 1 and S > 0 (upper-right region in Fig. 1) we
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obtain the Snowdrift game (also known as Chicken or
Hawk-Dove) [26], which represents a situation in which
the best thing is to do the opposite of what the opponent
does (i.e., it is an anticoordination game). The region
T < 1 and S < 0 (lower-left region) corresponds to the
Stag Hunt game [27], a coordination game in which what
is best is to do as the other player does. Finally, the other
two regions define the Prisoner’s Dilemma (T > 1 and
S < 0, lower-right) [28], where D is the best option no
matter what the opponent chooses, and the Harmony game
[29], with C being now the best strategy. In general, practi-
cally all the studies published on this two-parametric rep-
resentation of social dilemmas deal with the square
T 2 ½0; 2, S 2 ½1; 1 (referred to as ‘‘basic square’’ in
what follows) as this is deemed enough to understand the
four main classes of games, although other special regions
can be identified (see, e.g., [30]). With these payoffs, the
replicator mapping given by Eq. (2) becomes
xtþ1 ¼ xt þ xtð1 xtÞ½Sþ ð1 T  SÞxt; (4)
where xt now stands for the proportion of C strategists in
the population (the frequency of D strategists being obvi-
ously 1 xt).
To begin our analysis, we first consider the Lyapunov
exponent of the mapping in Eq. (4) as a function of T and S,
plotted in Fig. 1. As can be seen from the figure, below the
diagonal the Lyapunov exponent is negative almost every-
where, whereas above the diagonal there is a region with
intricate boundaries where the exponent remains positive,
and outside that region it becomes negative. Interestingly,
the basic square is contained in the region in which the
Lyapunov exponent is negative. We recall that a negative
Lyapunov exponent is indicative of periodic solutions and,
as will be discussed below, periods P> 1 do exist,
although always outside the basic square, where only the
well-known fixed-point solutions (P ¼ 1) are found.
Perhaps this is the reason why all this new phenomenology
has not been noticed before, and it indicates that capturing
the richness of evolutionary game theory, when viewed in
discrete time, demands the study of a larger payoff pa-
rameter region or, alternatively, of certain specific cases. In
fact, as the zoom in Fig. 1 shows, the boundary between the
chaotic and nonchaotic regions is very complicated, with
fractal features, as it is regularly the case in dynamical
systems. Another important remark is that in relation to
game theory we have observed two types of chaos. There is
nonphysical chaos when in the chaotic region the variable
xt becomes negative or takes values larger than 1, which
are unphysical in so far it is the frequency of C strategists
and therefore must be bounded by 0 and 1; this takes place
in the upper-left region, the Harmony game. On the other
hand, in the Snowdrift game, we have observed physical
chaos in the sense that the values of xt remain bounded
within 0 and 1 for all times, and therefore trajectories
represent actually realizable evolutions of populations. It
is important to realize, however, that even nonphysical
chaos can be relevant in the sense that while trajectories
become unphysical above 1 or below 0, the existence of
chaos makes it unpredictable in practice where any initial
condition will end, i.e., to which of the two absorbing states
xt ¼ 0 or xt ¼ 1 will become attached. Moreover, in case
the chaotic motion takes place only around one of these
two absorbing states, so that we know exactly in which of
them the system will freeze, the time  needed to reach the
final configuration is sensitively dependent on the initial
conditions and therefore unpredictable. These considera-
tions hold, in particular, when  is large and the system
stays in the physical interval [0,1] enough time before
hitting a boundary: we have verified that when the initial
condition is close to an unstable equilibrium (or repellor),
this is actually the case.
In order to gain more insight on how the transition to
chaos takes place, we have focused on the case T ¼ S ¼ A
and represented the Lyapunov exponent as a function of the
new parameter A. Figure 2 shows the behavior of the
Lyapunov exponent as a function of A. The upper plot
clearly shows that both in the region where we found
physical (A > 0) or unphysical (A < 0) behavior there is
a well-defined route to chaos. Furthermore, the unphysical
region reproduces the period-doubling route to chaos char-
acteristic of unimodal (one hump) maps, whereas in the
physical region we have a different but not unrelated route
that arises because of bimodality (two extrema) of the map
FIG. 1 (color online). Upper panel: Sign of the Lyapunov
exponent (bright: negative, i.e., periodic solutions; dark: posi
tive, i.e., chaotic solutions). Lower panel: Zoom of a zone of the
first region.
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when A > 0. For small to moderate A > 0 trajectories
settle into periodic and chaotic attractors generated sepa-
rately by each of the extrema of the map, but for suffi-
ciently large A trajectories spread and bounce between
both extrema and converge to new periodic and chaotic
attractors. This is the reason why in Fig. 2 the Lyapunov
exponent for large A > 0 differs from the familiar uni-
modal pattern shown when A < 0. The lower panel of
Fig. 2 shows the effect on the Lyapunov exponent of
additive noise in Eq. (4). As expected, we observe a
gradual smearing out of the fine structure due to the
removal of periodic and chaotic-band attractors with in-
creasing noise amplitude . This amplitude fixes the larg-
est period and number of bands present, 2NðÞ, giving rise
to the so-called bifurcation gap [31]. Importantly, the
chaotic behavior is not restricted to the diagonal: As shown
in Fig. 3 the boundary between the fixed-point solution (the
same as in the continuous time replicator equation) and the
period-two orbits takes a hyperbolelike shape. Then, mov-
ing outwards in the T-S plane, boundaries between period-
two and period-four orbits appear, and so on. It is important
to note that the plane region usually considered in these
studies, namely, the basic square T 2 ½0; 2, S 2 ½1; 1
(bottom left of, and out of, Fig. 3) contains only fixed-point
solutions, i.e., in that region the continuous replicator
equation and the discretized version we are studying here
lead to the same dynamical behavior. Finally, Fig. 4 illus-
trates the dynamics typically found in the route to chaos
along the diagonal (T ¼ S) of the region with physical
behavior. As A is increased, we observe the convergence
to the fixed-point, continuouslike solution, or to periodic
solutions until reaching chaos (bottom panel of Fig. 4).
This route to chaos appears an infinite number of times
along the family of attractors generated by unimodal maps
within periodic windows that interrupt sections of chaotic
attractors. In the opposite parameter direction, a route out
-2 0 2 4 6
A
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
L(A)
0
SH BoSHG
-2 0 2 4 6
A
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
SH BoSHG
L(A)
0
FIG. 2 (color online). Upper panel: Behavior of the Lyapunov
exponent along the diagonal T ¼ S, as a function of the parame
ter A ¼ T ¼ S, no noise. The acronyms indicate the games
found in the different regions: SH, Stag Hunt; HG, Harmony
Game; BoS, Battle of Sexes [5,20]. Lower panel: Same graphics
with noise ( ¼ 0:005).
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FIG. 3. Boundaries between areas of solutions with different
periodicity. Proceeding away from the bottom left corner, dots
indicate curves where the maximum Lyapunov exponent van
ishes and separate regions where the asymptotic state is a fixed
point, a period two orbit, a period four orbit, etc. The basic
square lies outside the bottom left corner of the plot, in the fixed
point region.
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FIG. 4. Examples of time behavior for the map with T ¼ S,
with xt being the cooperator density vs time. From to top to
bottom: periods one (fixed point) and two, period four, and
chaotic solution. Values of T and S indicated.
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of chaos accompanies each period-doubling cascade by a
chaotic-band-splitting cascade [19]. Bimodal maps with a
minimum and a maximum (as in the case A > 0) display
interesting variations of these attractor cascades.
In summary, we have studied a discretized version of the
replicator dynamics and found that there are large regions
of the T-S parameter space of the typical social dilemmas
for which considering discrete time leads to behavior
largely different from the continuous one. Indeed, beyond
the restricted region which has been analyzed before, we
observe that as the parameters T and S increase, periodic
(P> 1) and chaotic dynamics occurs. This is an important
difference with respect to the continuous time dynamics,
for which only fixed-point solutions are found. We have
also classified those novel behaviors as physical and un-
physical, depending on whether the values of the concen-
tration of C strategists remain in [0,1] or spread beyond the
boundaries of this interval. In the physical case, periodic
solutions imply that C and D strategists vary periodically
in frequency, the state of the system being generally mixed,
containing both types of individuals. Such cycles have only
been observed in the continuous replicator dynamics for
rock-scissors-paper games, i.e., games with three strategies
[1–3]. The occurrence of chaotic behavior adds unpredict-
ability to the features of the system, in complete contrast
with the predictive character of the continuous case. On the
other hand, periodic or chaotic behavior, even being un-
physical, still has important consequences: In the time
interval in which the trajectory is still contained in [0,1],
in the chaotic region it turns out that it is not possible to
predict whether, starting from a given initial condition, the
system will end up in a population fully consisting of C or
D strategists. We stress that our results may be relevant for
real life applications, in many cases involving bacteria,
animals or humans which are well described by social
dilemmas that do not have well-determined payoffs, and
often take place in discrete time. In principle, it is possible
to test our ideas in experimental setups, at least with human
volunteers, by setting properly chosen payoffs and inter-
actions as discrete events. Clearly, the appearance of peri-
odic orbits and chaos is generic and will affect other
strategic interactions when described by a discretized
equation. Unimodal maps (obtained, e.g., when A < 0)
show a rich self-affine structure of chaotic-band attractors
interspersed by periodic windows within which multiple
period-doubling and band-splitting cascades take place.
Bimodal maps (obtained, e.g., when A > 0) display more
elaborate attractor structures. These dynamical features
manifest in the discrete-time evolutionary dynamics
addressed here and translate into matching patterns of
population behavior.
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